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Consulting citizens: technologies of elicitation and the
mobility of publics
Javier Lezaun and Linda Soneryd
The new centrality of “the public” to the governance of science and technol-
ogy has been accompanied by a widespread use of public consultation mech-
anisms designed to elicit from citizens relevant opinions on technoscientific
matters. This paper explores the configuration of legitimate constituencies in
two such exercises: the UK “GM Nation?” public debate on food biotechnol-
ogy, and a Swedish “Transparency Forum” on the risks of mobile telephones.
We consider the apparently paradoxical combination in these two examples of
a tendency to produce static images of the public with a high valuation of
mobility—of citizens and their opinions—as the key outcome of deliberation.
We discuss the organizers’ careful delineation of a distinction between “stake-
holders” and the “general public,” and their aversion to any sort of “eventful-
ness” in public deliberations. Finally, we introduce the classical notion of the
“idiot”—the individual who minds exclusively his or her own private affairs—
and argue for the need to develop a new vocabulary to evaluate the politics of
“listening to the public.”
1. Introduction: public controversies and technologies of elicitation
“The public is always right”; or, at the very least, it is always right to listen to what the public
has to say when devising new policies concerning controversial science and technology. The
desire to seek lay views has become a sort of new orthodoxy in the governance of techno-
science (Irwin and Michael, 2003; Irwin, 2006; STAGE, 2005). This ambition to listen applies
particularly to reticent publics: the “hard to hear” constituencies that are deemed excluded
from the often cacophonous public debates.
From the point of view of government, two premises seem to underlie the ambition to
elicit public views: that lay publics can contribute useful insights, knowledge and values to
decisions that are inextricably political (Wynne, 2001), and that extending participation and
consultation throughout the policy process, all the way to the very inception of policy agen-
das, will assuage public mistrust in new technologies and reinforce the legitimacy of the insti-
tutions in charge of their regulation (Bentley, 2005).
Inevitably, this new centrality of the public has been accompanied by the deployment of a
range of technologies of elicitation. These are instruments, such as the discussion group, the
counseling meeting, or the citizen jury, designed to generate lay views on the issues at hand,
and feed those opinions into the policy process. Lay opinions on technoscientific matters are
typically produced in transient and experimental settings: the small group of individuals
assembled in a focus group, the public or semi-public forums in which citizens and experts
address each other for a few hours, the slightly more permanent “citizen juries” where stake-
holders and citizens aim to work out a common understanding of the issues under deliberation,
etc. These assemblies are managed by what Rose has described as “experts of community,” social
science and psychology professionals deploying the “whole array of little devices and techniques
that have been invented to make communities real” (Rose, 1999: 189–90). Technologies of elic-
itation, and the cohorts of experts that control their application and interpret their results, con-
stitute, a veritable extractive industry, one that seeks to engage publics in dialogue and generate
certified “public opinion” with the ultimate goal of increasing the productivity of government.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze, with these considerations in mind, two recent
cases of public consultation. Our first example is the public debate on genetically modified
(GM) crops conducted in the UK between 2002 and 2004, the so-called “GM Nation?”
public debate.1 Our second example is a “transparency exercise” carried out in Sweden in
2004 and 2005 on the risks and hazards of third-generation (3G) mobile phones, a consulta-
tion formally known as the “Transparency Forum for Mobile Phone Communication.” In
both cases we have analyzed the documentation generated by these consultations, including
some of the internal reports produced by the consultants who designed and managed the
exercises. In the case of the Transparency Forum (hereafter TF), we have also followed the
conduct of the deliberations in situ.2 Our two cases represent in many ways opposite formats
of public consultation. The GM Nation? debate was a large public endeavor, intended to pro-
vide multiple venues to any citizen willing to make his or her views on GM foods known.
The TF, in contrast, consisted of a series of small workshops with “stakeholders,” and its pri-
mary objective was to facilitate a mutual understanding of their often antagonistic positions.
By juxtaposing these two cases we hope to advance a political analysis of the forms of
sociality that underlie public consultations; an analysis that emphasizes “the price to pay …
to create and impose strongly articulated public spaces” (Callon and Rabeharisoa, 2004: 24).
Our two consultations are structured around a distinction between “stakeholders” or
“interested parties” (understood as those who already have a view on, or interest in, the issues
under deliberation), and the reticent or previously unengaged “general public” (the con-
stituency of those who, at least from the point of view of the organizers, are a priori empty-
handed so far as opinions and interests are concerned; individuals who either have little interest
in expressing their opinions, or may even have no opinion to express). In the eyes of the orga-
nizers of our two exercises, this distinction was challenged, but ultimately reaffirmed, by the
actual experience of confronting concrete publics. As we will argue, the resulting prioritization
of the “silent majority” of unengaged citizens over active “stakeholders” gives rise to a curi-
ous form of politics: one in which the individuals seen to abstain from participation in politi-
cal life, what the ancient Greeks would have known as “idiots” (idio-te-s, private individuals who
are exclusively dedicated to the privacy of one’s own, or idion), become the most highly val-
ued constituency in what is allegedly an attempt to broaden political participation.3
Before we flesh out these ideas, let us illustrate our approach to the sociality of public
consultation with an example drawn from a different topical and historical context: the
participation of the citizenry in the administration of justice.
2. The eventfulness of public engagement
In his analysis of social interaction in sixteenth-century Finnish courtrooms, the sociologist
Johan Asplund describes some striking forms of citizen involvement in public affairs (Asplund,
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1987).4 Visiting court proceedings was something that citizens did regularly in sixteenth-century
Finland; it was a normal activity through which one engaged in society as a citizen. In fact, those
who refused to attend court proceedings were viewed as anti-social and could be subject to fines.
Yet, the citizens who attended court proceedings did not simply provide an audience to the
proceedings. They were forceful and vocal, and their presence was instrumental to the very
administration of justice; with their behavior in the courtroom they could confirm or challenge
the judge’s verdict. Asplund describes how, already on their way to the courtroom, people began
to quarrel with, insult and abuse each other. Once in the courtroom, they not only hurled abuse
at the defendant or the plaintiff, depending on their sympathies, but made lawyers and judges
the target of their attacks. And these attacks were not merely verbal. As Asplund writes:
In 1591 Marjatta Hannuntytar was so furious over the verdict of the panel of “lay asses-
sors” that she burst into the courthouse and attacked one of the assessors and tore his hair
with both her hands. If you were not attacking undesirable people, you could destroy
whatever came into your way. … The sixteenth-century Finn was not indifferent in the
least. She seems to have been incapable of being nonchalant in the face of her equals.
The term “nonchalance” merges a negative prefix with the old French word chaloir,
which means warm, eager, urgent. (Asplund, 1987: 50; translated by the authors)
Citizens did not necessarily attend the proceeding with a view or opinion already formed; their
reactions were unpredictable precisely because they were shaped by the events and attitudes
they encountered during the trial. Asplund uses the term “social responsiveness” to describe this
kind of public participation. It refers to an improvised and immediate course of action, as
opposed to a controlled, mediated and choreographed response. To be socially responsive is to
be immediately affected and moved by the people and things around you and act accordingly.
Citizen participation in the Finnish courtroom was vocal, unprompted, unsolicited and unre-
strained, and this made the administration of justice a peculiarly eventful occasion. The people
assembled in public because their presence mattered; they played a central role in the drama of
justice.
In contrast, the Law today appears complete and predictable, uneventful and finished.
The actors involved in its workings are assigned clearly defined roles. “All parties act as if
they were not engaged in the proceedings at all; strictly speaking, as if they were not present
at all. If there is ‘affection,’ it appears as an inner state, which only occasionally and fastidi-
ously is let out” (Asplund, 1987: 53–4). If the public were to burst into shouting and scream-
ing, order would be called, or the meeting would simply be called off. The riotousness of a
sixteenth-century Finnish courtroom does not belong in our space of judicial administration.
This is particularly clear if we compare Asplund’s description of the sixteenth-century
courtroom with our best contemporary example of citizen participation in the administration
of justice: the jury. The jury is first and foremost an audience, in the literal sense that its
main form of sociality in the courtroom is to listen to what the parties and their spokespeo-
ple have to say. Jurors not only are carefully screened, but their participation in the court-
room is highly choreographed: their involvement is managed to be as uneventful as possible,
beginning with their preliminary interrogation (and, possibly, their pre-emptive exclusion).
Crucially, jurors are silent during the hearings; they rely on lawyers and judges to extract the
information they will use in their private deliberations; even when they are entitled to ask
questions they rarely make use of their right. Often they are isolated to protect them from
interfering influences, and their discussions are confined to a secluded space, the “jury
room.”5 There is a fundamental rationale for this sanitization of citizen involvement: the
complex rules and protocols that accompany jurors from the moment they are called to serve
their duty to the point where they declare a verdict are meant to safeguard the quality of each
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juror as a representative of an idealized citizenry, to make each juror interchangeable with
any other juror, and to transform the jury into a machinery of abstract justice. Formalization
is expected to maintain a certain “accuracy of reference” (Latour, 2004)—in this case, a sta-
ble justice, as defined by a sample of the citizenry.6
This brief excursus into citizen engagement in sixteenth-century Finnish courtrooms
serves us to introduce the dimensions of public participation that will structure our analysis
of the two consultation exercises. Public participation entails particular forms of sociality, and
every act of citizen involvement in public matters can be defined by its degree of eventfulness.
The term “consultation” suggests a highly formalized and carefully choreographed form of
engagement. Citizens are expected and sometimes forced to act in accordance with previously
conceived roles, and their participation is channeled to the production of a predictable, “fair”
outcome. The purpose of the consultation is to generate a stable referent (“justice,” “public
opinion”), and the foremost measure of the success of the exercise is the accuracy in reach-
ing this referent.
And yet, enticing the public to take a position on controversial issues can also give rise
to a form of social responsiveness that overcomes the bounds of mere “consultation.” It can
generate surprises, unanticipated events. We now turn to our two cases, the British public
debate on GM foods and the Swedish transparency exercise on mobile telephony. We orga-
nize our analysis sequentially, beginning with the design of the two exercises, continuing with
the problems of their conduct and management, and concluding with the production of mate-
rial outcomes out of the processes of elicitation.
Our two examples addressed technologies—food biotechnology and mobile telephony—
that have generated protracted and raucous public debate. The governance of food biotech-
nology has undergone a series of radical changes, and the last decade has witnessed the
creation of a plethora of new regulatory and semi-regulatory bodies in Europe. It was one of
these novel institutions, the UK Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission
(established in 2000), that recommended the conduct of a wide-ranging public debate on the
future of GM crops.7 The GM Nation? public debate was launched in July 2002 under the
supervision of a Steering Board composed largely of academics and non-affiliated experts.
Disputes over the radiation caused by the mobile phone infrastructure have raged for
decades, generating a well-established scientific doctrine on the thermal effects of non-ionizing
radiation on humans. While public anxiety over 3G telephony has given rise to new kinds of
scientific uncertainty over the non-thermal effects of the mobile telephony infrastructure, the
technical dimensions of these concerns have largely been ignored in the policy debate
(Stilgoe, 2005: 62; Drake, 2006). As a response to a widely spread public concern over the
radiation provoked by 3G transmitters in Sweden, the Swedish Radiation Protection
Authority (SSI), the agency in charge of determining acceptable levels of radiation, decided
to assemble in a “transparency exercise” some of the stakeholders in the 3G debate, includ-
ing groups highly critical of mobile telephony. The SSI had previous experience in respond-
ing to public mistrust in new technologies. In the 1980s and early 1990s, when the national
nuclear waste program met vocal local protests, the SSI tried to improve the quality of com-
munication with stakeholders by emphasizing broader participation and deliberation.
3. Designing the encounter with the public
The UK debate and the Swedish forum were premised on predefined communication models
that included criteria for the selection of relevant participants and, concomitantly, rules of
exclusion to screen out unwelcome members of the public. The fundamental distinction that
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guided the organizers was that between the “general public” (sometimes referred to as the
“silent majority”) and “interest groups” or “stakeholders.” In the view of consultation orga-
nizers, the former are characterized by the fact that their views are deemed unknown, or
nonexistent, prior to the consultation. The latter, on the other hand, are perceived as already
possessing a preformed position on the issues at hand, and it is around this position that their
particular identity has taken shape.
The GM Public Debate was organized to promote public deliberation on the future of
agricultural biotechnology, and to do so in accordance with the public’s own interests and
questions; to listen to the public in the broadest, most unstructured way possible, so as to
allow the public’s own concerns and frames to emerge. The “terms of reference” of the
Steering Board stated that the debate ought to pay special attention to the views of “people at
the grass roots level whose voice has not yet been heard,” and should also “provide mean-
ingful information to Government about the nature and spectrum of the public’s views.”8
Thus, from the outset the debate was meant to be both a forum for open-ended discussions
and a fact-finding exercise; a space for deliberation and a research tool able to unearth the
public’s true attitudes towards biotechnology. These two goals—deliberation by the public
and research on the public—proved difficult to combine.
In order to frame the debate along the lines of the public’s own concerns and interests,
the Steering Board decided to conduct a series of preparatory discussions known as the
Foundation Discussion Workshops (FDW). Groups of 18 to 20 carefully selected individuals
were given an opportunity to discuss food biotechnology in an open-ended way. The goal was
to discover the concerns and questions that animated the views, or lack thereof, of ordinary
citizens, and to use this information to structure the debate, thereby thwarting the tendency of
previous consultation exercises to address the questions and concerns of the consultants,
rather than those of the consulted. The consultancy firm hired to run the FDW used a combi-
nation of Heideggerian phenomenology and client-centered Rogerian psychotherapeutic
practice, in order, as the experts put it, to allow each and every participant “to engage with-
out having to adopt ways of being that are alien to him”:
This approach enables participants to engage with the topic(s) of discussion with the
minimum of prior framing by the researchers. The concerns and interests of participants
are tracked and followed throughout the Workshop process, and the energy with which
these concerns and interests emerge is used to guide subsequent questions, exercises and
interventions. Thus participants are provided with a great deal of ownership of the
process and how the process is structured. (Corr Willbourn, 2003a: 7)
This desire to draw topics and opinions out of the participants’ own frames of reference was
accompanied by a parallel attempt to exclude, or at least segregate, individuals or groups with
already-formed views. These were the people who had already been heard in the long and
rowdy debate over GM foods. The public debate had set out to listen to “ordinary citizens,”
defined by the consultants as individuals who had no “prior allegiance with, or connection to,
GM” (Corr Willbourn, 2003a: 8).
The distinction of these two kinds of publics was evident in a separation already enacted
in the preparatory workshops. Along with the seven foundation workshops composed of
“ordinary people,” the consultants assembled a group of activists in a separate group that
came to be known as the Actively Involved Workshop. The separation was reflected in the
consultants’ later interpretation of the discussion groups’ dynamics. While the seven groups
of ordinary individuals seemed happy to frame their discussion in terms of questions posed
to the organizers, the meeting of the already “actively involved” proved to be unavoidably
confrontational. “As soon as the substantive issues surfaced,” a report pointed out, “powerful
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disagreements were expressed” (Corr Willbourn, 2003a: 68–73). The ordinary citizens, in con-
trast, appeared more malleable; they could be affected by the process of deliberation itself.
The Swedish TF could not have had a more different goal. Rather than targeting the gen-
eral public or “ordinary people”, its key constituencies were the already configured “stake-
holders” in the mobile telephony debate. The form and content of the exercise was decided
“in cooperation with all concerned parties.”9 The mandate of the deliberation was open-ended
which, according to the organizers, was one of its most appealing characteristics. The com-
munication model used to guide the dialogue was based on Habermas’s theory of commu-
nicative action, and its basic principle was that broad participation, impartiality and
fairness—i.e. allowing a wide range of participants and perspectives to effectively influence
rules and agendas—would be conducive to a fruitful exchange of views.
SSI began the preparations for the TF by appointing a reference group whose members
were drawn from relevant national authorities, local governments, the mobile telecommuni-
cation business, and two “critical” groups: Vågbrytaren (the Wave Breaker), an environmen-
tal organization opposed to the increase of electro-smog in society, and the Swedish
Association for the ElectroSensitive. Electro-sensitivity is a term used to describe a variety of
symptoms (a burning sensation in the skin, nausea, headache etc.) that those afflicted associ-
ate with their exposure to electric and magnetic fields (EMFs).
Thus, unlike the GM Nation? debate, the purpose of the forum was not to articulate the
unheard voices, but to enhance dialogue between various well-known actors. The reference
group assembled by the SSI discussed possible mechanisms for allowing the general public to
participate in the debate. The original plan of the SSI and their commissioned consultants had
been to conduct a series of seminars with the stakeholders as a preparatory phase for a second
stage in which the wider public would be involved. However, when the ElectroSensitives and
Vågbrytaren rejected the offer of the telecommunication industry to finance this second phase
of the debate the plan was abandoned. In spite of the fact that the consultation was thus limited
to “stakeholders,” the distinction between “interested parties” and the “silent majority” was still
operative in the discussions and reflections generated at the TF. It was clear that the organizers
took for granted that the participants were not really representative of the “general public,” a
constituency they evidently thought was important to reach. The following discussion between
two of the consultants managing the discussion (C1 and C2), members of Vågbrytaren (V), a
representative of the mobile industry (MI), and a public health expert (E), shows how this gen-
eral, and absent, public figured in the deliberations:10
C1: How do we reach the silent majority?
V1: The question is why this majority is silent. Those who worry the most are the most
enlightened.
C1: This majority has another view on risk perception and is an important group in this
context. Can you make panel surveys to reach the opinions of the majority?
C2: There are many methods and panel surveys and focus groups are just two of them.
We must not forget that [during the second TF] many elected politicians were there
and they represent the public.
MI: Vodafone has an investigation over public risk perceptions. We can look at the avail-
able material.
V2: It is very questionable to use material that comes from Vodafone.
E: It should be used. We can look at the questions it raised; it can provide some of the
pieces of the puzzle …
While the GM debate tried to reach the “general public” through focus groups and a careful
segregation of participants (“ordinary” versus “actively involved”), in the TF the abstract
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general public was present in the discussion largely through its absence. It was a referent
always lying outside the discussion, an unreachable point of fugue that nevertheless
shaped the deliberations and, as we will see, affected the weight of the evidence generated
by the consultation.
4. The conduct of debate
In their design, the two consultation exercises followed particular models of the targeted public,
and of the best way of reaching it. These models prescribe a series of roles for the participants,
often schematic versions of general philosophies of communication. Yet, the formalized attrib-
utes and expectations are quickly confronted with the reality of the consultation meeting.
The key venues of the GM debate were the public meetings held throughout Britain in
June 2003. Six large events took place, organized by the Steering Board itself. There was a
second tier of around 40 regional and local meetings, and a third tier of over 600 local meet-
ings, organized by local volunteers. The debate included other venues of public participation:
the official website received 2.9 million hits between 1 June and 16 July (24,609 unique vis-
itors), and 36,557 feedback forms were submitted. The organizers received over 1,200 letters
and e-mails.
The fundamental problem for the organizers of the GM debate was how to balance the
fundamental reliance on public events, attended by people who were not previously screened,
with the stated desire to focus on individuals with no prior opinion—people, in other words,
who were unlikely to voluntarily show up at a public event to discuss these issues. The search
for “ordinary people” led some to question from the start the validity of the public meetings.
The presence in these public events of a majority of vocal, self-selected individuals was seen
as an insurmountable methodological problem. “It does concern me,” a member of the
Steering Board told the press after the first public meeting, “that people are using this as a
platform to publicise their views.” “A number of people,” another Board member argued, “are
just here to say something through a microphone.”11
Some newspapers adopted the same interpretation of the open discussions. An article
published after the first meeting described the event as “a unique experiment to find out how
ordinary people think,” but pointed out that the “only blemish on such noble intentions was
the absence … of ordinary people.”12 This view of the public events was substantially repli-
cated, and officialized, by the House of Commons’ inquest into the consultation. As the
Chairman of the Committee of Inquiry put it in his first question to the Chair of the Steering
Board during the parliamentary hearings:
I suppose the main criticism of this process was that necessarily it was always going to
be hijacked by people who were basically campaigning for one argument or the other
argument, and what one might call the ordinary “punter” either did not express a view or
found it difficult to express a view in the light of the way feelings were being expressed
and one could have predicted the outcome before it started. (HC Environment, Food and
Rural Affairs Committee, 2003: Ev. 1)
In this interpretation, which appears almost preordained (“it was always going to be
hijacked”), the public meetings served largely as a venue for stakeholders and activists to
express well-rehearsed arguments, rather than for “ordinary people” to engage uncondition-
ally in open-ended deliberation.13 To control this bias in the public events, the organizers
announced that they “were also canvassing views from carefully-selected focus groups, who
would form the control against which to compare views from the wider public debate.”14
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This resulted in a parallel strand of the GM Nation? debate known as the “Narrow but Deep”
component. It continued the model of the “foundation discussion workshops,” and consisted
of ten small focus groups, with seven to eight participants each (hence the “narrowness”)
who met twice, once for an introductory meeting, and again two weeks later to assess the
effects of the participants’ deliberation (hence the “deepness” of the exercise). Participants
were asked to keep a diary of their personal investigations and reflections on the GM issue
between the two meetings. The organizers hoped to allow participants’ opinions “to mature
and to change,” and to be able to trace this progress or evolution, and they asked participants
to keep a “daily diary” of their personal investigations and reflections on the GM issue
between the two meetings.
To ensure that the “narrow but deep” element consisted only of ordinary people, the con-
sultants used a recruitment questionnaire. Several kinds of individuals were excluded from
participation: those who had already participated in research or group discussions on topics
related or similar to GM, and those who during the previous five years had worked in adver-
tising/market research/journalism/public relations, the biotechnology industry, scientific
research into gene technology, or in a campaigning organization or any other group concerned
with biotechnology.15 As for farmers or those in the agricultural sector, only individuals who
professed to “have a completely open mind” about GM crops were allowed to participate.
As the screening rules make clear, the “narrow but deep” meetings were meant to repre-
sent a “general” public, to constitute a body of interchangeable citizens willing to engage in
the discussion agenda presented to them by the organizers. Not surprisingly, the conduct of
the “narrow but deep” meetings helped solidify a particular view of the attitudes of the “gen-
eral public” towards GM crops. Three key ideas were made clear by the “narrow but deep”
meetings: (1) that a majority of participants becomes increasingly concerned and negative
about GM over the course of the deliberation exercise; (2) that participants form and express
more opinions as they immersed themselves in the issue (i.e. the number of “don’t knows”
was significantly reduced from the first to the second meeting); and (3) that the more knowl-
edgeable “ordinary” people become, the more likely they are to believe that relevant knowl-
edge about the effect and implications of biotechnology was lacking.
But it was specifically the mobility of the participants in these discussions that struck the
organizers as their most remarkable characteristic. Participants in the discussions were notice-
ably moved by the experience. The movement did not constitute, the consultants emphasized,
a linear progress, “a straight line, from recruitment at the beginning through information gath-
ering and deliberation to conclusion.” The path of their evolution could be compared to “a line
that traced a circular path, starting at attitude on recruitment, circling out into questioning,
information gathering and deliberation and coming back towards the original position before
going out on another circuit” (Corr Willbourn, 2003b: 56). In their report to the Steering
Board, the consultants’ dwell on the trope of movement:
This curve would be traced many times. This is illustrated by the fact that a great deal of
what was expressed in the second meetings had been previously expressed in the first
meetings or in the work in the Daily Diaries. In some cases wherever the line swung out
to, it always passed back over the same point, in other cases it circled out and passed close
to, but not directly over the same point, describing a more spiral-like process. For many
this tended to lead to a movement overall away from their original opinion—for some this
was a slight movement, for others it was more noticeable. Thus most engaged in a recur-
sive process of information gathering and deliberation. For some this either deepened their
knowledge or appreciation of their initial intuitive understanding or, more explicitly, rein-
forced their initial position. Others, however, displayed a noticeable movement that took
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them beyond their initial position—either to a more pro or entrenched anti position.
(Corr Willbourn, 2003b: 56–7, emphases in original)
The fundamental aspect of the deliberation is thus, as the authors’ own italics make clear, the
idea of noticeable movement; the mobility of opinions along a non-linear path. Regardless of
whether they reached positions different from the ones they started from, participants displayed
a perceptible, traceable movement in their attitudes towards GM foods. The path might be cir-
cular, but it is not repetitive: it is recursive, or spiraling. The deliberation displaced the partici-
pants and turned them into mobile entities. The participants in the “narrow but deep” strand
obeyed what is, in the eyes of the consultants, the fundamental moral imperative of deliberation:
they allowed themselves to be moved (Callon and Rabeharisoa, 2004), in stark contrast with the
immobility and rigidity of the positions expressed in the public meetings.
The Swedish Transparency Forum on mobile phones was arranged on very different
premises. A small number of participants took part in three discussion workshops. The first
meeting comprised some 40 participants and lasted a full day, while each of the two subse-
quent meetings lasted two days and involved around 60 participants. The three meetings were
held in or around Stockholm, and the participants were largely from this area. The size and
format were partly a consequence of the lack of funding, and the organizers were willing to
accept that the final arrangement constituted a sort of “mini TF.”
The TF organizers had made an effort to bring together highly polarized groups, and from
the start disagreements were thus clearly visible. This very fact, however, moved participants,
albeit in a different fashion from that described in the reports on the GM debate. The discus-
sions did not lead the stakeholders to change their positions in any visible way, or to trace any-
thing resembling the “recursive process” of the “narrow but deep” meetings. But the heated
and antagonistic atmosphere moved participants emotionally. The mere presence of groups
holding radically opposing views in the same room, and the need to engage with them, could
have intensified the clash of views and the sense of insoluble conflict, but there is also evi-
dence to the contrary.
The format of the three TF seminars was a mix of small group discussions and plenary
sessions, presentations and interrogations. It was assumed that the participants had well-artic-
ulated opinions and possessed a relatively stable set of identities before they entered into the
consultation. Yet, even in such a highly staged event, an element of surprise and a degree of
eventfulness could not be completely excluded. Take for instance the discussion over the phe-
nomenon of electro-sensitivity. The members of ElectroSensitive, with their deeply held con-
victions about the correlation between their illnesses and exposure to EMFs, faced opposing
but similarly strong views about the non-existence of such correlation. During lunch, and in
small group discussions at the margins of the official meetings, representatives of regulatory
authorities and mobile phone companies made comments to the effect that the identity at the
heart of the electro-sensitives (and the main reason for their presence there), was at best ques-
tionable. “The only thing that could help [the electro-sensitives] would be cognitive behav-
ioral therapy,” a participant said. “It can be a problem to be too complaisant to their demands,
since that is in fact to admit that they are right,” another argued.16
On the other hand, on several occasions the same actors who denied that the phenomenon
of electro-sensitivity actually existed acted as if it did. The first TF seminar was held in a place
chosen for the benefit of the most severe electro-sensitives.17 The first thing participants did
upon entering the meeting was to turn off their mobile phones, wrap them in aluminum foil, and
put them in a box outside the building. They had to do the same with their electronic car keys
(after they had moved their cars further away from the building if they were parked too close).
As one of the consultants put it, “We were actually rather complaisant” [towards the demands
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from the electro-sensitive].18 That is, even though some of the participants entered (and exited)
the TF meeting denying openly the very phenomenon of electro-sensitivity, they acted respect-
fully towards the demands of other participants. In this sense, the TF meetings caused some
movements in the actors’ previously defined positions, at least temporarily. After the first TF
event, a representative of Vågbrytaren, referring to the representatives of the mobile phone oper-
ators, pointed out that “some of them were actually rather touched; they are beginning to realise
that this is real. But it is difficult to tell how it affects them in the long run.”19
Yet, from the point of view of the organizers, what characterized the TF was still the polar-
ization between those who were “critical” and those who were “uncritical” of the existing regu-
lations on mobile phone radiation. This forced the organizers and the reference group to address
two types of problems.20 The first was how to balance the two sides of the debate—which experts
to invite and how to keep a balance between researchers on the critical side and those on the
uncritical side. After the second TF seminar an SSI official admitted that “there was a strong bias
… We had hoped that the composition would be more heterogeneous, many expressed the same
critical opinions.”21 Second, the stated intention to “reach a better understanding” and to enhance
dialogue between polarized groups presented the organizers with constant challenges in the
administration of the deliberation. Established rules for producing a good dialogue had to be
made explicit to the participants repeatedly, and the organizers had to continuously rebuke par-
ticipants who deviated from the rules. This occurred when voices were too sharp and the discus-
sions turned into what the consultants termed “debate” (characterized, in this view, by
antagonistic parties trying to win over each other), rather than “dialogue” (in which participants
listen and try to understand each other). On one occasion the moderator plainly told participants
that the heated exchanges were obstructing a “good dialogue” from taking place.22
The effort to control the events had varying degrees of success. In one instance, the rules
for the achievement of a proper dialogue were explicitly stated by the moderators (to avoid
sarcasm and leading questions, to give suggestions and supportive responses to others, etc.).
In addition, the various parties were asked to appoint a group leader to ensure that the rules
were followed. However, the participants often ignored these rules—by not appointing a
group leader, or by making aggressive assertions, such as provocatively placing on the table
evidence supporting their case.23 The desire of the organizers to formalize the formal proce-
dures of the TF was related to the expectation that all parties would listen to each other and
be affected by each other’s arguments—to the point, perhaps, of being willing to change their
minds. The organizers wanted the participants to be moved by the experience of deliberation,
and reacted strongly—explicitly restating the rules of the game—when they felt the antici-
pated dialogue degenerated into mere debate. The organizers faced an implicit choice—
between adjusting their model of preferred communication to the actual process of exchange
or adjusting the participants to their predefined conception of the adequate debate—and gen-
erally opted for the latter.
5. Material outcomes: the de-mobilization of the public
In principle we can identify three potential outcomes of a consultation exercise. We have
mentioned the first one: the changes in attitudes, emotions and positions of those who
undergo the process, including the organizers. The second outcome is a more material one:
the documents and other written accounts that emerge from the consultation, and particularly
the final report attempting to officialize a singular meaning for the exercise. The third possible
outcome is more difficult to ascertain. It concerns the effects of the consultation on those
who did not participate in it, specifically its influence on governmental policy, and on the
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strategies of the “interest groups” involved in the controversy. Assessing this kind of
influence would require an analysis of policy changes and mobilization strategies in the
aftermath of the consultation, something we cannot provide here. This section will recapit-
ulate our ideas about the mobility of participants, and describe the official reports and eval-
uations that emerged from our two deliberative exercises’ .
We have already discussed the effects and affects of public deliberation and its ability to
move the actors involved. As participants engaged in information gathering they could remain
static in their positions but could also be taken beyond them. The “narrow but deep” discussions
in the GM debate were described by their organizers as generating a very noticeable kind of
mobility in contrast to the large public meetings, which were described as dominated by fixed,
static positions. The Transparency Forum enrolled actors with previously identified views (and
on the basis of those views), and would seem to have caused only a slight and humbler kind of
movement, one that brought participants closer to each other and made future contact easier,
even if their opinions were still polarized. Referring to the “critical groups,” an SSI official
stated that “at least we have established a contact with some of them and realized that they are
serious and really worried about this … In the future, when SSI is planning new recommenda-
tions we can gather these groups again.”24
Beyond the effects on participants, the most tangible outcomes of our two cases were the
written reports through which organizers officialized a particular meaning of the consultation.
The GM Nation? official report was released by the Steering Board in September 2003. An
official evaluation of the TF, conducted by professional evaluators commissioned by the SSI,
was ready in February 2006. The TF evaluation was meant to be released in conjunction with
the official TF “report,” but the purpose and content of this report became a matter of dispute,
and, as of April 2007, it has not yet been released. We will thus focus on the official report of
the GM debate and the official evaluation of the TF to try to understand the dynamic force of
such documents.
The fundamental purpose of the official report of the GM debate was to bring together,
and give coherence to, the multiple strands of the consultation, to extract a single narrative on
biotechnology and the public from the multifaceted experience of the debate. The central
problem was how to integrate what the report itself identified as two rather different sources
of evidence: on the one hand, the opinions expressed by the “self-selected” participants of the
public meetings (and those, similarly “self-selected,” who had sent letters and feedback
forms), and, on the other, the views of those carefully chosen individuals who had participated
in the “narrow but deep” discussions. The report tried first to emphasize the commonalities
between the views and attitudes expressed in the public and private settings:
We found that the content of the debate was very similar right across each spectrum.
Whether they write a letter or an e-mail, or visit the website, or express themselves in a
meeting, or sit down with each other in a deliberative process, people raise the same types
of issues and concerns about GM. They use the same kinds of arguments whether they
are asked to think hard about the issues or choose to express themselves from the top of
their head. (Steering Board, 2003: 38)
However, in uneasy juxtaposition to this effort to produce a single narrative, the report devotes
most of its space to teasing out the specific lessons to be drawn from each venue of participa-
tion. The report establishes a distinction between the kinds of opinions expressed in the public
events, and those articulated in the closed meetings—and, more importantly, between the kinds
of people who expressed them. This distinction is based on a fundamental assumption: that
GM is an issue “far removed from ordinary life and the mainstream of current politics”
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(Steering Board, 2003: 79), that it “is not a salient issue in most people’s ordinary lives”
(p. 97). From the premise that ordinary people are not unduly concerned with the issue of GM
foods, the report logically deduces that those individuals who took an active interest in the
debates and volunteered their participation must be special and not representative of the “gen-
eral” public. Obviously, if one begins by assuming that ordinary people rarely think about GM
“in their daily lives” (Steering Board, 2003: 15), one can easily deduce that those who attended
the open meetings must be extra-ordinary, and therefore unrepresentative. A similar conclusion
is drawn with respect to those who made the effort to write a letter or send an e-mail to the
Steering Board: “They are also unusual people. … GM is not a salient issue in most people’s
ordinary lives. If it is unusual to write a letter for publication about anything, it is fair to sug-
gest that it might be even more unusual to write a letter about GM” (Steering Board, 2003: 97).
Furthermore, these extra-ordinary people were easily characterized as having established,
entrenched views, in contrast to the participants in the “narrow but deep” discussions, who
came to the meeting with “no fixed position on GM” (Steering Board, 2003: 94).
The official evaluation of the TF on mobile telephony presents important differences with
respect to the report of the GM debate, differences that reflect the dissimilar goals and scope of
the exercises. The fundamental purpose of the TF evaluation was to present the dynamic process
and the open and participatory working method that characterized the discussions among stake-
holders. The aim of the TF had been to improve dialogue and illuminate opinions on mobile
telephones, and the ideal result for the organizers would be the evidence of a “multiplicity of
questions raised,” rather than any singular narrative or set of univocal answers.25 Thus the pri-
mary ambition of the document was not to give a coherent picture of the participants’ views on
mobile phone technology, but rather to present the method of dialogue, the specific mode of
conduct of the seminars, and the forms of exchange that characterized the interaction of partic-
ipants. The emphasis was on the methodology of deliberation and its virtues.
This methodology prescribed that the participating stakeholders should be involved in the
formulation and writing of the final report, that the document that would bring closure to the
exercise ought to be the result of the work of all the actors involved in the forum. This led to
some unanticipated problems. Representatives of Vågbrytaren and the ElectroSensitives, for
instance, carried out a thorough and time-consuming effort to compare the formulations pro-
posed in the draft report with tape recordings of the actual discussions, and concluded that the
phrasing of the former had sometimes been subtly changed to the advantage of the SSI and
the disadvantage of Vågbrytaren and the ElectroSensitives.26
While the final report suffered never-ending delays, the evaluation commissioned by the
SSI (and based on interviews with the participants) became the only available document
offering an “official” interpretation of the consultation. The evaluation described the impact
of the deliberations on the participants as “perishables,” fragile gains in need of attention in
the near future:
Our results show that the aim of the project has been partly reached. The project has
made an impact, mainly at the level of individual participants … The positive effects
achieved are to be treated as perishables. SSI, as the driver of the project, has in practice
a special responsibility in this context and also an opportunity to maintain a continued
dialogue and actively demonstrate that it has listened to other actors. We believe SSI
should act to create some kind of forum for continued dialogue, drawing on the experi-
ences from Transparency Forum. (TF Evaluation, 2006: 3–4; original quote in English)
The key to these positive effects was the face-to-face meetings and the personal relationships
that emerged and evolved throughout the consultation. It is not surprising that the evaluators
would stress this dimension of the exercise, since the evaluation was commissioned to assess
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the discussions in light of the communication model employed by the organizers, a model that
emphasized the value of personal contact and informality in the production of mutual trust.
Indeed, the elaboration of the TF evaluation can be interpreted as a way of improving the cor-
respondence between the model employed to design and organize the consultation and the
conclusions that would emerge from the exercise.
Finally, we would like to discuss the response of the respective governments to the consul-
tations. (In the case of the TF, and since the SSI is an independent expert authority responsible
for this policy field, it is in particular the agency’s own responses on the TF that are interesting
in terms of policy outcomes.) After launching the GM debate, the UK government promised to
respond in writing to the conclusions of the debate, in the hope that this “will reassure the public
that their participation is worthwhile.”27 The response was issued by the Department for envi-
ronment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) in March 2004. The document was a joint response
to the three reappraisals of biotechnology that had just taken place—the GM Public Debate, the
Scientific Review, and the Economic Assessment of GM crops. The decision to respond to the
three strands in a single document proved important: the government was thus able to “weigh
up” the evidence from the three processes, and to find in the Science and Economic reviews
responses to the “concerns” expressed by the public in the public debate.
The government’s response construes the public debate as, fundamentally, a research
exercise. It “has helped to improve our understanding of what people really think about GM
crops” (DEFRA, 2004a: 11). The debate was no longer an open-ended deliberation process
but primarily a fact-finding enterprise, guided by an ideal of accuracy, and meant to discover
the stable “concerns” and fixed “anxieties” that dominate the public’s imagination of GM
foods. The government “recognized” these concerns and pointed to the different ways in
which the existing regulatory process already responded to the fears raised in the discussions.
“We have looked at these concerns carefully,” the government wrote, “and we have concluded
that for the most part the regulatory regime which is now in place is capable of addressing
them, but that on some issues further action is required” (DEFRA, 2004a: paragraph 4.9).
The ability of the government to describe the public debate as expressing a series of sta-
ble concerns is based on the sharp distinction between the open and the closed strands of the
debate, a distinction that the official report of the debate had helped solidify. In its response,
the government quoted paragraphs from the report to support the claim that the participants
in the open and closed meetings represented radically different constituencies, and that only
the latter, the carefully screened individuals enrolled in the “narrow but deep” groups, offered
an accurate representation of the general public’s attitudes towards GM foods. According to
the government, the “narrow but deep” strand “enabled the debate process to take account of
the views of those members of the public who might not normally have chosen to take part,
in contrast to the ‘self-selecting’ participants in the debate,” and represents “one of the more
successful features of the debate, serving as an important ‘control’ on the findings of the open
process” (DEFRA, 2004b: paragraph 23).
We have to take the term “control” in the above sentence in its most literal sense: the gov-
ernment used the evidence of the closed sessions to neutralize the open meetings and the gen-
erally critical attitude towards GM foods that transpired there. Rather than vocal opposition,
the government argued in its response, “the predominant feeling among the Narrow-but-Deep
sample was one of uncertainty and this was largely because they felt uninformed” (DEFRA,
2004a: paragraph 3.3).
The citizens that participated in the “narrow but deep” discussions, and by extension the
“general public,” appear as more malleable constituencies, less inflexible and categorical than
the stakeholders or self-selecting “activists” of the open meetings. They lack a definitive com-
mitment to either side of the debate, and are characterized by a sense of uncertainty and an
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openness to learn (and, correspondingly, to frame their participation in the form of questions,
rather than opinions). This is a far more promising public for a government seemingly bent
on leaving the regulatory regime for GM crops unaltered. But there is an interesting paradox
here. Whereas the debate organizers used the “narrow but deep” groups to generate a mobil-
ity of opinions, to produce a trajectory of deliberation, the government’s response relies on
these discussions to produce a static image of “public concerns” as a set of fixed and clearly
identifiable attitudes. The discussion groups were particularly useful to the consultants
because they managed to move the participants. Yet, the government was keen to present their
views as stable and static. The open meetings had been criticized for being dominated by a
set of stationary viewpoints, but in effect a very similar image of public opinion as an inert
entity characterizes the government’s response to the deliberation process.
Let’s now turn to the TF. The response of the SSI to the official evaluation has been to
state formally that it will follow the recommendation of the evaluator to foster a continuing
dialogue with the stakeholders and preserve the “perishables” obtained from the first round
of dialogue.28 If the SSI manages to continue the discussion, it will have succeeded in further
mobilizing the groups critical to mobile telephony. This would likely be more beneficial to
the SSI than to Vågbrytaren or the ElectroSensitives: vague calls to dialogue are often more
valuable to the organizers of the debate than to those invited to participate. The SSI has been
involved in subsequent discussions on these issues. When the Swedish government initiated
a new evaluation of its environmental goals, it delegated the work on radiation protection to
the SSI, which has invited back all those who were involved in the TF. This devotion to fur-
ther dialogue does not seem to have had any effect, however, on the SSI’s own criteria of risk
assessment. In this sense the agency appears keen to mobilize stakeholders in a continuing
dialogue on the risks of mobile telephony, but does not seem particularly willing to be itself
moved by the process of consultation.
6. Conclusion: malleable “publics” and the political value of mobility
Processes of consultation appear very differently depending on whether they are observed
from the point of view of organizers and their consultants, or from the perspective of those
consulted. For the former, consultation is a process of elicitation, a mechanism for extracting
relevant opinions and incorporating them into the process of government. As we have noted,
elicitation always depends on shaping, restraining and harnessing particular forms of social-
ity, often in accordance with theoretical models of what proper communication and citizen-
ship ought to look like. These models are always in play—even when their ostensible purpose
is to allow the public to frame the process in their own terms. From the point of view of the
consulted, however, consultation always entails action: whether they voluntarily attend a
public meeting or are selected to participate in a private discussion, they must necessarily act.
And action generates movement and surprises.
Judged from the point of view of sponsors and organizers, the British public debate
and the Swedish Transparency Forum represent two possible methodologies for extracting
relevant public opinions. In their format, design, content, and expected outcomes they express
different models of public deliberation, and divergent mobilization strategies. We have juxta-
posed them in an attempt to draw out the generic forms of sociality that characterize these
political experiments.
The consultations were structured along a key distinction between a “general public” and
“stakeholders.” The distinction is based on one fundamental attribute: the possession or not
of a set of clearly delineated opinions or interests prior to the process of deliberation.
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Stakeholders are those thought to come to the consultation armed with predefined views. In
the eyes of organizers and consultation experts this makes them relatively immobile—their
opinions are hardened, their positions entrenched. In the GM Nation? debate stakeholders
were often described as “hijacking” the public meetings, using them simply to “publicize
their views.” The “narrow but deep” groups were assembled to generate the kind of mobility
that proper deliberation demands but “self-selecting” participants did not deliver. Anybody
with a pre-existent connection or commitment to any particular view on the GM issue was
systematically excluded from these meetings. This allowed the organizers to present the
selected groups as a more accurate representation of the “general public” and, those who were
excluded, as extra-ordinary by definition. It also made it easier to ensure that participants
were affected by their involvement in the discussions, and allowed the consultants to trace a
visible movement in their opinions.
The Transparency Forum on mobile telephony soon abandoned any hope of representing
the “general public,” or of altering the opinions of its participants. It attempted instead to elu-
cidate the stakeholders’ values and facilitate mutual understanding. It tried to move the stake-
holders in a more subtle way: by bringing them together and forcing them to act as if each
other’s views had some merit, the organizers hoped to make future exchanges easier and keep
the flame of “dialogue” alive. Owing to budgetary constraints, the Forum did not make an
effort to represent the general public, but this external constituency was a referent towards
which the discussion was often oriented. Moreover, its absence certainly diminished, in the
eyes of the organizers, the representative value of the exercise—and thus its possible influ-
ence on policy.
The value of mobility underlies this distinction between “general public” and “stake-
holders”—the latter defined as static, the former as fundamentally movable—and is the cen-
tral category in our analysis. Yet, the qualities of mobility depend on whether it is observed
from the point of view of the consultants or the consulted. For the former, mobility is a desir-
able, indeed crucial, attribute of participants and their opinions—we saw the satisfaction with
which the managers of the GM Nation? debate recorded the trajectory of movement traced by
participants of the “narrow but deep” discussions. In a different context and under different
constraints, the TF evaluation made clear that the degree to which participants had been
moved by the process of deliberation was the fundamental value of the discussion—the rea-
son, beyond mutual clarification, to pursue this kind of exercise.
We can characterize the goal of organizers as mobilization: they want to move partici-
pants, to affect them and their views, to generate movement, to break deadlocks. There is a
desire to generate narratives of change, even conversion, as the key utility of deliberation and
the measure of its productivity; proof that the individuals who come out of the process are not
exactly the same who entered it, that attitudes and opinions have been affected by the
exchange of viewpoints.
Mobilization looks rather different from the perspective of the participants. Whether they
take part in public, open-ended meetings or in highly controlled discussion groups, delibera-
tion is always a form of action. Action implies, first and foremost, movement. Action refers
etymologically to the process of “setting something into motion” (Arendt, 1998: 177), and thus
entails the making of new and unexpected connections—in Latour’s terms (1998, 2004), novel
“articulations.” As Arendt “The boundlessness of action is only the other side of its tremendous
capacity for establishing relationships, that is, its specific productivity” (1998: 191).
This poses a challenge to the models of the public brought to bear on consultation exer-
cises. For instance, the open meetings of the GM Nation? debate were often characterized
by a form of “social responsiveness” that did not correspond to the ideal of a proper discus-
sion that guided the sponsors’ and their consultants’ efforts. It was similarly evident in the
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distinction, emphasized by the managers of the Transparency Forum, between a proper
“discussion,” in which participants are willing to listen and try to understand each other (to
be moved) and a “debate,” characterized by antagonism. There is little room in these pre-
scriptive models of deliberation for the agonistic element of debate, or for the possibility that
people would be unaffected by discussion and remain in their “entrenched” positions.
Confronted with a contradiction between ideal models of communication and the reali-
ties of deliberation “in the wild,” organizers do have a choice: to adjust their model to the
actual process of discussion, or to adapt the public to the model. The “narrow but deep” meet-
ings of the GM debate are a successful example of the latter. Only in them did the consul-
tants’ model of a fully deliberative—and thus highly mobile—individual take concrete shape.
But this was achieved by excluding from the proceedings any individual with a commitment
to the issue under deliberation. The “man without opinions” was the central character in these
meetings, for it was the only one light and malleable enough to be properly moved and mobi-
lized by the consultation exercise.
This reliance on the perfectly uncommitted individual represents a peculiar return to the
figure of the idiot, the person with no known opinions or unprompted interest in public matters.
In the GM Nation? debate the unengaged became the only legitimate constituency of public
deliberation, because they were the only ones who seemed capable of undergoing the sort of con-
version that consultants expected. The uncommitted were the only ones who produced the kind
of movement that consultants were eager to register. In the famous funeral oration, Pericles noted
that “We alone regard the man who takes no part in politics not as someone peaceful, but as some-
one useless.”29 The opposite seems to be true in consultation exercises: the unengaged, the quiet
citizens, are the most useful of publics, because they are the one authoritative source of repre-
sentative opinions, and the only constituency weightless enough to be moved by the kinds of con-
sultation exercises and deliberative process that governments and their consultants dream up.
The conflict between different assumptions about publics and their mobilities is
expressed in the final reports and evaluations that close the consultation exercise and offi-
cialize a particular meaning. When the writing of the final report is shared among the partic-
ipants, as in the case of the Transparency Forum, difficulties naturally arise: the process of
writing becomes indistinguishable from the process of deliberating, which explains the delays
in the production of an “official version” of the consultation. The report of the GM Nation?
debate offers an opposite example: an official document written by the (very) few—perhaps
a single individual—establishing a radical separation between the phase of debate and its
write-up. What was often a cacophonous discussion—or, more exactly, a multitude of loosely
coordinated ones—is turned, through a dramatic “delegation of speech” (Callon and
Rabeharisoa, 2004), into a multifaceted but ultimately coherent story. While the GM Nation?
report does its best to capture the diversity of motives, ideas and movements expressed in the
debate, it ends up producing a stable image of “the public,” and thus a static target for the gov-
ernment’s reply. It is striking how the interplay of different mobilities that characterized this
multi-pronged exercise eventually was reduced to a stationary model of the public: “ordinary
citizens,” represented by the few dozen people involved in the “narrow but deep” groups, were
characterized as having a set of fixed “concerns.” The debate was organized and described in
such a way that this transition from movement to stasis became possible and plausible.
We do not want to suggest that consultation exercises, such as the two described in this
article, are guided by a hidden agenda and that governments pay only lip service to the need
to listen to the public. We are disinclined to simply brush off the rhetoric of consultation as a
tactic of “crafted talk,” according to which “politicians track public opinion not to make pol-
icy but rather to determine how to craft their public presentations and win public support for
the policies they and their supporters favor” (Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000: 55). If only because
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this argument implies a distinction between genuine action and symbolic action that we
would like to avoid (Blühdorn, 2007).
Instead of searching for hidden motives and real objectives—which would lead us back
to interrogations over the “accuracy of reference” whose usefulness for understanding publics
we have rejected—we would like to argue that public consultations are processes of mobi-
lization and engines of movement. They may have a purely instrumental objective—to pro-
duce utility for government by incorporating “public opinion” into policy-making—but they
can and often do become highly eventful: they generate unpredictable movement, of people
and issues, and give rise to forms of social responsiveness and articulations that spill over the
models of interaction that organizers bring to bear. We would like to suggest that, rather than
measuring the success of a consultation on the basis of the accuracy with which it captures a
static general public, we should also include among our metrics of political value the way in
which they produce new articulations of the issues under deliberation, and the degree of
mobility they generate—not only in those who are consulted, but also in those who consult.
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Notes
1 A thorough evaluation of the GM Nation? debate can be found in the report produced by the “Understanding Risk
Team” (A Deliberative Future?). The report is available at: http://www.uea.ac.uk/env/pur/gm_future_top_copy_
12_feb_04.pdf. For a summarized version, focused on the methodological implications of the debate see Rowe
et al. (2005). See also Irwin (2006) for a less normative account of the case and its broader implications.
2 Our study of the Transparency Forum is partly based on having access to the inner sanctum of the deliberation,
while our interpretation of the GM Nation? debate draws exclusively on publicly available sources. This analyt-
ical asymmetry is compounded by differences inherent in the design and characteristics of our two cases. The
GM Nation? debate had a strong public component—the public meetings served as its most visible face—while
the Transparency Forum was a “private” affair, with only selected participants.
3 The term “idiot” did not have in ancient Greece the same kind of pejorative sense it has today, and it is in this
non-pejorative sense that we use it here. “Idiot” served to describe a type of individual who, by refusing to par-
ticipate in political life, by minding exclusively his own affairs, became useless to the polis.
4 Asplund’s study is an exegesis and critique of a previous study by the historian Pentti Renvall.
5 The uneventfulness of modern juries is limited to their public performance. Their private deliberations can prob-
ably be as heated and emotional as anything a sixteenth-century courtroom ever witnessed.
6 The character of modern juries is linked to their formalized role in the administration of justice. The range of
behavior available for the public in the sixteenth-century courtroom was undoubtedly broader—but their
influence on the verdict was largely unpredictable. In contrast, juries have to conform to strict rules of behav-
ior and judgment, but they are also guaranteed a very substantial and clearly defined role in shaping the final
verdict.
7 The call for a broad public discussion on food biotechnology coincided with parallel reviews of the regulatory sit-
uation of GM crops in the UK, including an assessment of the scientific evidence on the safety of genetically mod-
ified organisms, and a re-examination of the economic implications of GM agriculture. See www.gmscience
debate.org.uk for the documents of the scientific review, and the report “Weighing Up the Costs and Benefits of
GM Crops” (Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, 11 July 2003) for the economic evaluation.
8 “Aims and Objectives for the GM Public Debate,” available at the official debate website: http://www.gmna-
tion.org.uk/ut_09/ut_9_ex3.htm (accessed 28 November 2006).
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9 Minutes from Preparation Meeting for TF, 17 April 2004, SSI 2004/1828–52. Available at the Swedish Radiation
Protection Authority, Stockholm. This and the following quotes from the TF case are translated by the authors.
10 Minutes from the reference group meeting, 16 February 2005.
11 “Public GM views ‘will count,’” Farmers Weekly Interactive, 4 June 2003. This interpretation of the open meet-
ings as dominated by vocal “activists” is based on the experience of the large, first-tier events. Whatever took
place in the hundreds of smaller and largely unsupervised discussions remained largely invisible as far as public
accounts of the GM Nation? debate were concerned.
12 “Government’s 10-day public road show opens with a whimper,” Guardian, 4 June 2003.
13 In this line of criticism, the assumption is that the “activists” are generally those opposed to biotechnology.
Those who expounded the views of the biotechnology industry, for instance, were rarely described as “activist”
or “self-selected.”
14 “Public GM views ‘will count,’” Farmers Weekly Interactive, 4 June 2003.
15 This exclusion criterion also applied if any member of the family, relative, or close friend of the potential par-
ticipant had been employed in any of these areas.
16 Second TF, 9 February 2005, observation.
17 At the second and third TF seminar, two of the most severe electro-sensitives participated over the phone.
18 Personal communication with one of the consultants, February 2005.
19 Telephone interview with the member of Vågbrytaren who is responsible for its information and media contacts,
December 2004.
20 No participant was explicitly labeled “uncritical.” Yet, a consequence of labeling Vågbrytaren and the
ElectroSensitives as “critical groups” is that the others are “uncritical” or perhaps “neutral.”
21 Interview with SSI official (director for the area of non-ionizing radiation), March 2005.
22 Second TF, observation.
23 Second TF, observation.
24 Interview with SSI official.
25 Reference group meeting, 16 December 2005, observation.
26 Personal communication with representatives of the ElectroSensitives and Vågbrytaren, May 2006.
27 Letter from Margaret Beckett, 20 January 2002.
28 Strålskyddsnytt, 2006.
29 As recorded in Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War.
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